

Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation

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"The withdrawal of Soviet forces is the key to resolving the Afghan crisis."

President Reagan, November 12, 1987

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The following report was prepared by Craig Karp, Afghanistan analyst, with the assistance of other analysts in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Department officials. It is part of an annual series of Special Reports on the situation in Afghanistan.

Introduction and Summary

After 8 years of brutal war on the Afghan people, the Soviet attempt to control Afghanistan has failed. The conflict between the Soviet occupation force and the Afghan resistance grinds on, but it has changed. Death, destruction, and the suffering of an innocent people continue, but military, diplomatic, and political events have moved against the Soviets. These pressures may lead Moscow to end its horrible and ultimately futile endeavor in Afghanistan.

In the 8th year of Soviet occupation, the military initiative in many ways passed to the *mujahidin*. They dictated a higher level of combat, which was higher throughout the year and less subject to seasonal fluctuations. The regime announced a cease-fire in January and extended it in July and again in November, but its forces did not keep the cease-fire commitment.

Soviet forces also were more active but ultimately adopted a more reactive, defensive posture. In the latter part of the year, they pulled back from several isolated bases. The Soviets and their Afghan clients have seen their unques-

tioned dominance of the skies slip. They have suffered increased losses in the air and on the ground. Kabul's forces deserted repeatedly, sometimes by the hundreds, and force levels are maintained mostly by press-gang conscription.

Despite a year-long effort, the Soviet proxies in Kabul failed to entice either their Afghan opponents or prominent neutrals to support or join a government dominated by Najibullah (Najib) and his People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In January, Najib announced a campaign for "national reconciliation." Offers of some form of participation have been made to Afghanistan's former monarch, Zahir Shah, to a variety of prominent non-party Afghans, and to leaders of the resistance, who rejected these offers and refused to become "reconciled" to Soviet domination (even if disguised in Afghan clothes). The regime made more concessions over the year that also were unacceptable to the Afghan people.

The PDPA, Moscow's chosen instrument of rule, has become weaker. Party factionalism was further complicated by the purge of former party leader Babrak Karmal and his followers. Although Najib has little personal support, even within the party, he had himself named head of state in September. In December, when a new constitution was imposed by an illegitimate, party-packed assembly, Najib had himself elected president. At that session the regime changed its name from the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" (DRA) to the "Republic of Afghanistan" (RA).

The Afghan resistance continues to challenge Soviet and regime control from every corner of the country. In

the last year, however, it became a greater threat. *Mujahidin* military capabilities grew in many ways—better cooperation and air defense meant that many areas of the country were effectively free of Soviet regime control. *Mujahidin* morale is at an all-time high. Political cooperation within the seven-party resistance alliance in Peshawar improved. In October, the Alliance members selected Maulavi Mohammed Yunis Khalis of the *Hezb-e-Islami* (Khalis) party to an 18-month term as its *Rais*, or leader.

The UN-sponsored indirect talks on the Afghan issue continued in 1987. The proximity talks—between Pakistan and the Kabul regime—narrowed differences on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the only outstanding issue. In two rounds, in March, and September, the gap narrowed to 16 months offered by Kabul and 8 months by Pakistan. By the end of the year, Najib suggested Kabul might accept 12 months or less.

Diplomatically, the Soviets tried to improve the government's international legitimacy by sending Kabul emissaries on a 6-month-long worldwide diplomatic and public relations campaign. Kabul scored some gains in diplomatic recognition, but the overall effort failed. Other countries continued to condemn the occupation and reject the Soviet assertion that there is any solution to the Afghan issue short of Soviet withdrawal. In November, at the General Assembly, 123 nations, the largest total to date, voted for a resolution calling for the immediate and complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The resolution has passed with increasing margins every


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Military Activity

The level of fighting was consistently higher than in the past and less subject to seasonal variations. Combat occurred dramatically in the winter. Summer combat also was at historic

The War of the Cities

The Soviets and the regime increased their emphasis on urban security in 1987. As a result, *nonahabin* penetration and operations in major urban centers became more difficult and less frequent. The Soviets improved defensive belts around the cities, and resistance rocket attacks had to be made from greater distances. In the cases of Kabul and Qandahar, the defensive posture required costly and almost constant operations around the cities'



edges to keep the *mujahidin* off balance. The sights, sounds, and casualties from nearby combat served to curb any increased sense of urban security.

Kabul. Kabul remains key to international perceptions of the security situation in Afghanistan, but calm in the city often coincides with heavy fighting in the surrounding areas.


Soviet upgrading of the defensive infrastructure—now three rings extending up to 20 miles from downtown—prevented major military losses like the spectacular destruction of the Kharga arms storage facility in 1986. About 22,000 Soviet troops are in the Kabul vicinity. They are supported by about 10,000 Afghan army troops and considerable numbers of militia, state security (KHAD), and *Sarandoy* forces.

Whenever there is a major security alert—because of threat, regime event, or high level visit—the Soviets take charge of security in the capital. Soviet tanks guard key intersections every night during curfew. Security concerns were particularly apparent during the January visit of Foreign Minister Shoyardnadze and CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) adviser Dobrynin. Kabul skies were well lit by the flares dropped by Soviet escort aircraft during their arrival.

Nevertheless, security remains a major problem, even in the city itself. The frequency of small arms fire from Soviet or Afghan security posts reflects the level of tension in the city. Protracted firing or exchanges usually indicate that the *mujahidin* have been spotted or have attacked security elements.

Intraparty or intraregime factional disputes also erupt frequently, with exchanges of fire clearly audible from regime installations. Urban dislocation, refugee influx, and degenerating regime cohesion also contributed to an increase of crime and attacks by regime and Soviet personnel on civilians, particularly in the spring.

The *mujahidin* focus their attacks on regime military and official and Soviet targets. Enjoying strong popular support, they avoid attacks which would harm the general population. The resistance may have reduced rocketing in recent years in order to avoid civilian casualties, although they also were deterred by Soviet security measures. Rocketings focused on specific targets, such as on the Soviet cultural center in



January, and four rockets that disrupted Najib's November *Loya Jirga*. In September, the Soviet Embassy complex was hit by mortars. Bombings increased in 1987.

Kabul Vicinity. If the capital itself was somewhat quieter this year, its surroundings saw record combat. Bagram Airbase to the north of Kabul, perhaps the most important Soviet base in the country, often was hit by rocket attacks.

The area along the Salang highway to the Soviet Union was the scene of fierce fighting most of the year. In the spring resistance attacks triggered severe Soviet retaliation in the Shomali that caused numerous refugees to stream into Kabul. In August, this 40-mile basin was hit by its most destructive Soviet attack since the invasion. Thousands of residents fled indiscriminate rocket, artillery, and air bombardment. Both *mujahidin* and Soviets

suffered heavy casualties, but regime losses were limited to heavy desertion. The highway itself was closed several times by resistance attacks and once, in April, by a snowslide that completely destroyed a 70-man Soviet post at Khenjan, north of the Salang tunnel.

To the east of Kabul, in early July, a coordinated attack on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway caused the loss of several Soviet outposts and a number of vehicles. In the west, the level of fighting fluctuated in Paghman throughout the year, beginning with an unusual winter offensive by the *mujahidin*. Artillery flashes and bomb blasts here are visible in Kabul. Soviet operations in August destroyed orchards to eliminate *mujahidin* cover.

Herat and the West. There are continued reports of heavy fighting in and around Herat. The *mujahidin* were particularly effective in the spring. Damage in the city remains severe, although the regime has launched some repair programs. The Soviets have bulldozed a large swath across the western part of the city and turned the western outskirts into a free-fire zone. By late in the year, these security measures have apparently succeeded in limiting *mujahidin* operations in the city.


Resistance forces continue to operate outside the city, where they are targets of intense, but not precise, high altitude bombing. Regional commander Ismail Khan continues to broaden his areas of influence—see Central Afghanistan. One of the largest regime militia formations in the Herat area defeated to the resistance in early fall.

Qandahar. Qandahar remains a war-torn city. Soviet regime forces took the lead during the winter, when Qandahar is traditionally the major theater of conflict. *Spetsnaz* (Special Forces) and other operations focused on resistance resupply efforts and caravan interdiction. But their efforts failed to make a major impact, as the resistance in Qandahar remained well stocked and key to the logistics train deeper inside the country.

In Qandahar, the resistance is well organized with a local council, including all parties, presided over by a nonpartisan elder. Most actions involve *mujahidin* from several parties; they choose a leader from among the participating commanders at a war council. Early in the year, the resistance almost succeeded in gaining full control of the old city from the regime.

By the onset of summer, the capital of southern Afghanistan and its surrounding areas had become the scene of what has been, probably, the heaviest concentration of combat of the war. In late June, Afghan forces led a drive up the Arghandab Valley. They were turned back by well entrenched *mujahidin*, although prominent local commander Lida Malatag was killed. Regime military suffered severe losses, and hundreds of troops deserted.

Soviet and regime forces launched several other operations over the summer. The regime was only able to provide troops for these operations by drawing forces from all over Afghanistan, particularly the north. The long series of Soviet regime drives into the



Commander Masood with captured Soviet artillery at Kalafgan (Abdul Hafiz)

Panjvat and Mahalagat Valleys were costly and did not overwhelm resistance formations, but they did keep local *mujahidin* off balance. The Soviets used the opportunity to extend the security belt around Qandahar. In addition, they bulldozed a grid network of roads through the old city, indiscriminately destroying homes and shops.

While resistance activity has been complicated, the *mujahidin* still operate in the city. Combat continued on a steady basis throughout the latter part of the year, with the *mujahidin* in full control of outlying areas.

In the latter part of the year, Soviet military correspondents in the Qandahar area painted a particularly grim picture. On September 18, an *Inter-Sputnik* correspondent reported:

If you judge by newspaper reports, especially television reportage, on what is happening in Afghanistan, especially in the south, you get the impression that columns of people returning home fill all the roads leading into Afghanistan, that the national reconciliation policy has already led to a situation where yesterday's enemies kiss each other in the city squares. But you go to Qandahar and you'll see how it really is.

The city is one big ruin. There is shooting all the time. Nobody would give a brass farthing for your life if you took it into your head, say, to walk down the street unarmed.

A Soviet drive established as many as 70 security posts to guard the road from Qandahar to the Pakistan border. These posts were manned with tribesmen loyal to militia leader Gen. Ismatullah Achekzai, who 2 years ago became the regime's prize defector from the *mujahidin*. In September, 35 groups belonging to six parties launched a coordinated attack along a 40-mile stretch and took many of the posts.

Ismatullah is a warlord without particular loyalty, who often fought party officials, especially Interior Minister Gulabzoi. In November, on his way into the Kabul *Loya Jirga* where he was a delegate, Ismatullah was wounded in a shootout with security guards. A number of his followers were killed in subsequent gunbattles. Whatever his ultimate fate, regime control in the south is shaken.

The North

Over the past year, resistance activities markedly increased north of the Hindu Kush Mountains—once considered relatively secure for the Soviets—and even spilled over the Soviet border. *Mujahidin* actions included the storming of regime garrisons, a rocket attack on the city of Mazar-e-Sharif during the anniversary of the April coup, and a variety of attacks in the northwest (near the gasfields).

Comparatively little Soviet regime offensive action occurred in the Panjsher Valley as *mujahidin* commander Masood concentrated his efforts north of the Hindu Kush. Following news of successes in the north, rumors spread that he was about to, as he did in 1985, storm the most exposed regime garrison in the valley, Peshghowr. In October, the base's defenders suddenly pulled further back into the valley, leaving Peshghowr to the *mujahidin*.


The Council of the North strengthened its organization and ties with parties other than the founding Jamiat-i-Islami. However, perhaps the heaviest fighting of the year anywhere in Afghanistan among *mujahidin* groups took place in this region.

Mujahidin in Masood's sphere are organized in four levels: self-defense units defend villages from attack; second-level units defend whole valleys; mobile groups with training and heavy weapons attack and operate on a provincial level; and central units are the potential core of a professional resistance army and operate throughout the north. Extensively trained and experienced, they have been a crucial element in the garrison assaults. Fighters from a number of groups in the north and elsewhere have trained with Masood's units.

Northern council forces were responsible for some of the major resistance successes of the year. In July, they attacked and stormed Kalafgan, less than 50 miles from the Soviet border. More than 100 regime prisoners were taken, and large amounts of weapons, including light artillery, were seized. The operation was led by local *mujahidin*, including *Harakati-Isqiah-i-Islami* (Nah) forces, and planned by Masood. The garrison sits astride a major supply route for Soviet forces just inside Afghanistan. A late summer Soviet supply operation along this road was heavily contested by the *mujahidin*.

In October, local forces, *mujahidin* from the Ittihad of Sayyaf, and council forces overran the regime garrison at Koran va Monjan, in Badakhshan, astride a critical supply path into the Panjsher.

Because of careful planning, Masood's assaults have been successful with relatively few casualties. The Soviets and the regime have not been able to reoccupy the garrisons overrun by Masood during the last 2 years.



Kabul broadly publicized the late summer defection of Abdul Rasul Phelwan, from Faryab Province in the northwest, who delivered French journalist Alain Guillo to the regime. The size of Phelwan's group testifies to long-standing resistance presence in this sensitive region near the gasfields and the Soviet border, which continued after his defection. In December 1986, Kabul media had reported that Phelwan had been killed by the regime security forces.

Across the Soviet Border


The resistance has long operated across the Soviet-Afghan border, sometimes along traditional smuggling routes. Usually this movement has simply involved the distribution of Korans and party cards into the largely Muslim republics of Soviet Central Asia, but there have been occasional armed attacks.

In 1987, for the first time, Soviet media acknowledged two assaults, in both cases after *mujahidin* claims were

replayed in Western media. On March 8, resistance forces rocketed a match factory in Pyandzh, a city on the Amu Darya River border. Soviet media acknowledged the raid in April. On April 19, TASS reported that on April 9 *mujahidin* slipped across the border and attacked a contingent of Soviet border guards, killing two. It stated in harsh terms that the U.S.S.R. would do everything necessary to protect its border. Soon after, KGB chief Chebrikov visited the area and addressed the border guards about the threat to Soviet security. By May, Soviet media denied the existence of *mujahidin* incursions, which had tapered off. By the end of the year, however, there was at least one additional *mujahidin* action inside the U.S.S.R.

After both raids Soviet forces from the U.S.S.R. immediately launched both counterinsurgent and reprisal attacks on Konduz and Takhar Provinces.

PROVINCES



death and destruction effort to construct a corridor south of the border. Civilian casualties were enormous, and numerous villages were destroyed. Refugees from these attacks constituted the most visible—and appeared the most miserable—group that entered Pakistan all year. Few refugees had previously fled to the north.

Eastern Afghanistan

Mujahidin activity increased in the eastern provinces. Several large Soviet regime operations occurred, but the day-to-day Soviet regime presence declined.

Nangarhar and the Konar Valley.

Much of Nangarhar has become liberated territory. Foreign journalists noted farmers planting in areas under *mujahidin* control that previously had been abandoned. The provincial capital, Jalalabad, was under constant resistance pressure. The road to Pakistan remained open, but the *mujahidin* exerted nearly as much control over what travels on it as the regime.

In late October and November, a long-awaited *mujahidin* assault hit a number of Soviet and regime posts and

garrisons in the Konar Valley. The operation—one of the most broadly coordinated operations of the war—involved several parties and attacks on almost every bivouac, from Barikowt almost to the Kabul River. Barikowt did not fall but remained under siege as it has been since the war began. A concentrated attack on the Soviet garrison at Asmar was an example of increased *mujahidin* readiness to target Soviets, as opposed to Kabul regime installations. Soviet and regime forces took substantial losses, but all garrisons in the valley held.

Paktia. Paktia Province, on the border of Pakistan, is the site of heavy resistance concentration and a hub of transport routes. It has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting of the war.

In late May, a multiregimental force of about 5,000 Soviet troops moved to attack *mujahidin* near Ali Khel, in one of the key battles of the conflict. They were backed by tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, including 152mm self-propelled guns along with Kabul forces.

The Soviet assault was accompanied by intense air attacks, but the attackers dropped bombs from high altitudes, apparently trying to stay out of

the reach of *mujahidin* defense. Several Soviet regime aircraft—perhaps a dozen—were shot down. Forced to rely less on air power, the Soviets attacked with the most intense artillery fire of the war.

The most dramatic engagement occurred when Soviet regime forces tried to attack *mujahidin* positions near Bayan Khel. When initial air strikes and artillery barrages failed, Soviet troops, led by elite *Spetsnaz* commandos, charged. They were repulsed by the *mujahidin* in fierce hand-to-hand fighting with heavy casualties on both sides.

Some regime units at Bayan Khel attempted to surrender but were stopped when they were bombed by the Soviets and incurred heavy casualties. Despite such antidefection measures, hundreds of regime soldiers defected to the *mujahidin*. Observers in Kabul reported almost daily funerals. At one mass funeral, mourners clashed with the police. Kabul media claimed the regime captured a number of Arab nationals who were fighting with the *mujahidin* in Paktia.

The battle was notable for the ability of the *mujahidin* to stand and fight, for their good logistics, and for the excellent cooperation between resistance parties. Several of the Peshawar resistance leaders personally participated in the battle, which boosted *mujahidin* morale. Despite substantial casualties, the *mujahidin* claimed a victory in Paktia, and their morale reached its highest level since the Soviet invasion.

In November-December, a major battle occurred around the regime garrison at Khowst, scene of a large resistance attack in 1985. The *mujahidin* tightened their siege of Khowst and on a number of regime positions on this vulnerable plain. In the city food was in short supply, and casualties were high.

A major Soviet-Afghan counteroffensive was launched from the provincial capital Gardez with an unprecedented amount of artillery firepower—in an apparent effort to open the road to Khowst, closed since 1979. By late December, the Soviets and their allies had not broken through. *Mujahidin* poured into the area to resist the advance, coordinated as in previous years by joint provincial commander Jallaluddin Haqqani (*Hazrat-e-Islami Khales*).

Central Afghanistan

Afghanistan's Soviet forces evacuated their garrisons in Bamian—after a resistance attack—and in Chagecharan, capital of Ghor Province, in the summer. However, the regime retained control in these cities, since Afghan forces remained.


In general, the situation in the Hazarajat was relatively quiet and free of regime presence. Most of the area remained under the influence of pro-Iranian groups, but the traditionalist Shi'a *Shura* party continued to hold fringe areas and operate against the Soviets.

A remote part of southern Ghor Province was the scene of one of the most broadly based meetings of commanders ever held inside Afghanistan. Chaired by Ismail Khan of Herat (Jamiat), the meeting included hundreds of *mujahidin* and commanders from several parties and many of the provinces of western Afghanistan. For several weeks in July, this large group—unharrassed by Soviet regime forces—discussed military and political issues.

Their communique, distributed inside and outside the country, called for practical measures to improve military coordination, including improved communication. It demanded military and political unity and chastised the political leaders for not being able to work together. It called for the establishment of a national commanders' council and a role in determining the future of Afghanistan.

An Increasingly Powerful Resistance

The Afghan resistance is a broad national movement encompassing almost the whole population inside the country. Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and Afghans in exile throughout the world. The military side of the resistance, the *mujahidin* fighters, are grouped in hundreds of fronts in every part of the country. Most are affiliated with one of seven parties headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, which have joined to form the Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan Mujahidin (IUAM), generally referred to as the Alliance. (See p. 8 for the seven parties and their leaders.)



Mujahidin with anti-aircraft gun (top) and with 107mm rocket (bottom)

The growing resistance threat is partly due to the improvement in quantity and quality of resistance supplies in recent years. Despite recent efforts to interdict resistance supply lines, the Soviets have not been able to staunch the *mujahidin* logistics flow. As a Soviet army correspondent described the supply train, "Caravans sometimes number up to 300 or 400 pack animals. They travel not only on camels but they use trucks and tractors. Their guards are mobile—on horseback or motorcycles."

Small arms are plentiful, and the *mujahidin* still get significant supplies from sympathizers or through capture from the regime military and from the Soviets. They have used 107mm and 122mm rockets, like the Soviet model BM-21 multiple rocket launcher, to exert increased direct and standoff firepower.

Advanced surface-to-air missiles have improved resistance air defense and made heavy machine guns, still the mainstay of resistance air defense, more effective. Soviet regime aircraft losses are up, and more important, attacking pilots are more cautious—cutting the impact of their air power.

Improving resistance strength also comes from more training and combat experience (which leads to better tactics), expanded cooperation (intergroup fighting has steadily declined), and the



rapid development of a communications and supply network in a country that in peacetime had only the most basic road system. The Soviets have not been able to counter these developments, and while Soviet forces rotate, the *mujahidin* remain, and know the terrain intimately. Over time, the *mujahidin's* gains have increased.

The resistance's cumulative military and political successes have greatly boosted their morale, which, in 1987, rose to its highest level since the invasion.

Resistance Alliance Leadership

On November 18, 1987, the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahidin, the Peshawar Resistance Alliance, chose Mohammed Yunis Khalis as its *rais* for an 18-month term. (The term *rais* can mean president or chairman, but most Afghans understand it to mean leader.) Following is a listing of the seven Alliance parties and their leaders:

Islamic Party (Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis): Maulavi Mohammed Yunis Khalis. Khalis was born about 1920 in Nangarhar Province, near Pakistan. He was educated in religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan and acquired the title Maulavi (religious teacher). In the 1950s, Khalis lived in Kabul as an author, editor, and teacher of Islamic studies. In 1965, he became politically active and went into hiding after the Daoud coup in 1973. His son was arrested (and subsequently killed), but Khalis himself escaped to Pakistan. In the 1970s, he helped form the *Hezb-e-Islami* and took up arms against the communist regime. In 1979, Khalis became leader of the faction of the *Hezb-e-Islami* that bears his name. Among Khalis' adherents are some of the most effective commanders of the resistance: Abdul Haq of Kabul; Jaliluddin Haqqani of Paktia; and Mullah Malang of Qandahar. Khalis himself is renowned for going into Afghanistan and personally participating in combat.

Khalis was chosen as the first spokesman of the combined resistance alliance in 1985 and served 6 months as spokesman just before being named *rais* in October.

Following are other party leaders, beginning with the two who accompanied Khalis in October:

Afghanistan National Liberation Front (*Jabh-e-Najat-i-Melli*)

Political Developments. Whereas the pace on the battlefield was dictated by the *mujahidin*, many political efforts responded to regime initiatives. Reacting to Najib's January campaign, the Alliance held an unprecedented demonstration in January in Peshawar that was attended by hundreds of thousands of refugees and *mujahidin*. The seven leaders appeared publicly together and denounced the Kabul regime. They called for:

Afghanistan): Sebghatullah Mojadeddi. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi comes from one of the most respected religious families in Afghanistan. Mojadeddi was born in Kabul in 1925. He has an MA degree in Islamic law from Al-Azhar University in Cairo and taught theology at Kabul University during the 1950s. In the 1960s, Mojadeddi was imprisoned by the former Afghan King, Zahir Shah, for suspicion of involvement in a plot to assassinate Khrushchev. He fled to Denmark where he lived and taught Islam. Mojadeddi has traveled extensively in support of the resistance.

National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (NIFA) (*Mahaz-e-Melli*): Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani. Gailani, about 55, is a hereditary religious leader. A graduate of the Faculty of Theology of Kabul University, for many years he was a religious adviser to King Zahir and later to President Daoud. He also was active in commerce. Gailani, who advocates a parliamentary system for Afghanistan, has been an articulate spokesman for the resistance.

Islamic Party (Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin since 1974): Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar heads the Islamic Party (Gulbuddin faction), one of the largest and oldest resistance groups. A Pashtun, Gulbuddin was born in 1947 in Konduz. While a student of engineering at Kabul University in the mid-1970s, he became a prominent figure in the Islamic movement. He fled to Pakistan in 1974 and launched armed resistance against the Daoud regime. Gulbuddin was recently reelected head of the *Hezb-e-Islami* (G).

Islamic Society (*Jamiat-i-Islami*): Burhanuddin Rabbani. Rabbani was born in Badakhshan in 1942. Rabbani studied, then taught

Islamic Law at Kabul University in the early 1960s. In 1968, he received a PhD in Islamic philosophy from Al-Azhar University in Cairo and returned to Afghanistan to become dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law at Kabul University. A Jamiat member since 1968, he was selected leader in 1972. He escaped arrest in 1974 and then moved to Pakistan. Rabbani is the leader of the party of Masood and Ismail Khan of Herat—two of the most effective resistance commanders.

Islamic Revolutionary Movement (*Harakat-e-Inqilab-i-Islami*): Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Nabi Mohammadi was born in Lowgar in 1925. He operated an influential Islamic school in Afghanistan in the 1960s where he was vociferously anti-communist. He was a member of the Afghan Parliament during 1970-74. He has lived in Pakistan since the 1978 coup. Nabi Mohammadi was elected joint Amir (chief) of an earlier resistance alliance by the Jamiat and *Hezb-e-Islami* (Hikmatyar) Parties in 1979. When that arrangement dissolved, he formed his own party.

Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittihad-i-Islami*): Abd Al-Rab Abd ul-Rassul Sayyaf. Sayyaf, a Ghilzai Pashtun, was born in Paghman around 1944. He graduated from Kabul University with a BA in theology, then earned a masters from Al-Azhar University in Cairo. He then returned to teach at Kabul University where he was active in the Islamic movement. He was imprisoned for 6 years following the 1973 coup. After his release under a post-Soviet invasion amnesty in 1979, he fled to Pakistan. In 1980, Sayyaf was elected chairman of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and then served as the chairman of the old seven-party alliance from 1982 to 1985.

- A total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces;
- An interim *mujahidin* government, which would hold free and fair elections; and,
- Resistance unity and arbitration of interparty disputes.

In April, the resistance parties announced a scheme for election, to be held among the refugees and the population inside Afghanistan, particularly among the commanders. The elections were postponed, however, due to the

difficult security conditions inside the country. Also in the spring, having successfully completed the rotation of the role of spokesmen among all seven Alliance leaders, the parties decided to give Mohammed Yunis Khalis a second term as spokesman.

In July, again rejecting regime proposals, the party leaders in Peshawar reiterated their positions that, should the Soviets leave, they would not indiscriminately retaliate against Kabul

regime personnel, would pursue non-alignment, and would maintain correct relations with Afghanistan's neighbors.

In October, as Khalis' term as Alliance spokesman expired, the Alliance met again to further refine its organizational arrangements. A *Shura*, or council, was chosen, with equal representation from each party. The *Shura* chose Khalis for the new post of *rais*, or chairman, of the Alliance (see p. 8). Although the Alliance displayed significant political development, its members continue to disagree on Afghanistan's future and sometimes on tactical issues.

International Relations. In 1987, Alliance leaders were increasingly visible on the world scene. Individual leaders were welcomed in many countries. In January, they attended the Islamic Conference in Kuwait. In November, *Rais* Khalis led an alliance delegation to the United Nations for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Afghanistan debate. Following the successful UN vote, Khalis took a delegation to Washington to meet with President Reagan.

The Soviets in Afghanistan

The Military: A Changing Soviet Strategy

The Soviets have shifted their strategy over the years. At first, their efforts focused on the major cities and on the areas around the road between Kabul and the Soviet Union. They concentrated on large attacks. The Soviets used up to 20,000 troops in their numerous drives into the Panjsher Valley and high-level carpet bombing.

Several years ago, the Soviets began to notice an improvement in the *mujahidin* supplies and placed more emphasis on cutting off the flow. They focused on the border areas near Pakistan and increased helicopter use and adopted small unit tactics. Many believed these tactics would help build the Afghan army and destroy the *mujahidin*, and these tactics were successful for a time. But the *mujahidin* have learned how to counter these tactics, so their success was temporary.

In the past year, the Soviets again have been forced to shift their strategy. This time they were more on the defensive. They no longer have complete control of the air. The Soviets reduced

Zahir Shah

In addition to its appeals to the resistance Alliance, the Kabul regime, explicitly, and the Soviets, implicitly, have referred to the possibility of some future role for the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. In a November 1987 interview, Zahir stated that the determination of a role for him "is up to the Afghan nation."

Mohammed Zahir Shah was born in 1914 in Kabul into the Muhammadzai branch of the Durrani Pashtuns. He was educated in Afghanistan and France. Zahir was Assistant War Minister and Education Minister prior to ascending the throne in 1933, following the assassination of his father, and reigned for 40 years. In 1964, King Zahir promulgated a new constitution which allowed for a parliamentary system featuring a *Wolesi Jirga* (National Assembly) and excluded members of the royal family from government positions.

While on tour in Italy, Zahir was overthrown by his cousin and former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud, who declared the Republic of Afghanistan. (Daoud was killed in the communist coup of 1978.) Zahir Shah has since lived in Rome.

their efforts to stop the movement of supplies, although they occasionally attacked caravans, and tended to operate less in the border areas. Major operations appeared to keep the *mujahidin* off balance and unable to attack while the Soviets improved their defenses in the major cities—Qandahar, Herat, and Kabul. Over the summer, Soviet forces pulled out of several isolated bases, leaving much of the country without a Soviet presence.

Infrastructural Constraints.

Under Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets have only marginally increased their forces in Afghanistan. This may not be a solely political decision; it also may reflect the potential difficulties of supplying additional forces using the rudimentary transportation infrastructure in rugged Afghanistan. Indeed, because of the limited transportation network beyond the immediate border area, they have had some problems supplying the troops there now—particularly during periods of sustained combat.

Soviets in Combat in 1987. Soviet combat forces may have increased slightly since last year. A few new artillery units and slightly higher personnel levels in units already in the country, raised overall Soviet troop strength to about 120,000. According to most estimates, some 30,000 troops in the U.S.S.R., primarily just across the border, support combat operations, including flying combat air missions from the U.S.S.R. Most Soviet troops remain in static defensive security deployments. The performance of the average conscripted Soviet soldier remains unimpressive.


During the past year, the Soviets drastically altered their tactics in the face of the resistance's improved air defense. While small sweep operations continued on the ground, they no longer had ample air support. Operations now include massive amounts of artillery and appear to develop more slowly. Heliborne assaults by elite troops also decreased as casualties mounted.

Aircraft losses have soared over the past year. For some periods the Soviet Afghan side lost an aircraft a day—or more—to resistance fire. Aircraft downings were particularly high in the early part of the year, then declined as pilots began to stay out of the reach of *mujahidin* gunners. Total Soviet Afghan losses were in the range of some 150–200 aircraft for the year. These losses forced the Soviets to re-evaluate their tactics. In some areas there has been a marked decrease in Soviet air activity with a resulting drop in air losses.

Soviet and regime aircraft are flying higher and faster, which reduces the accuracy with which they can deliver their ordnance. They also employ countermeasures which degrade their performance. The Soviets may be more reluctant to use their devastating helicopter gunships, relying instead on faster—but less accurate—fixed-wing aircraft. Yet, even fixed-wing pilots have become more reluctant to challenge *mujahidin* air defense.

The Soviets have made efforts to reduce casualties—even though combat operations increased—and over the past year probably another 3,000 Soviets were wounded or killed, bringing the total number of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan since 1979 to at least 33,000–38,000, more than one-third of whom were killed. These estimates do not include heavy losses to disease. Total losses may be significantly higher;

Significant Combat in Afghanistan - 1987



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some Soviet sources cite 50,000 or more, or 25,000 killed over the course of the war. Despite publication of numerous requests for casualty data in Soviet media over the last year, Soviet authorities have only hinted that the numbers might be released after a Soviet withdrawal.

Moscow continues to place great faith in deploying *Spetsnaz* troops. With reduced air support, and increased *murabidin* awareness of their tactics and methods, however, *Spetsnaz* troops have not been as successful as they were initially. Casualties have increased, morale has suffered, and they have been fought to a standstill and

sometimes defeated. *Spetsnaz* performance is now at about the same level as other regular forces in Afghanistan.

Throughout 1987, the Soviets continued to pour new equipment, especially artillery, into the country. Many of the new weapons were the best self-propelled artillery pieces in the Soviet inventory. For example, two types of sophisticated 152mm cannons, a 122mm howitzer, and a new automatic 82mm mortar have all been sent to Afghanistan to compensate for reduced

air support. Most of it was destined for Soviet forces, but Kabul's forces received a share.

Infrastructure improvements continued unabated - airfield runways are being improved, revetments made for aircraft, and fuel and ammunition storage sites expanded to include the construction of mountainside and underground bunkers. Security zones around Kabul and other major cities are being increased. These defensive installations are key to the Soviet strategy of protecting the cities. These measures indicate Soviet plans to depart the country, if any, have not yet been reflected in actions on the ground.

Soviet forces continue to suffer serious morale problems in what returning veterans have called "a dirty war." Soviet propaganda cannot obscure from their own troops the reality that they are fighting a war against the Afghan people. Disease is rampant, particularly dysentery and hepatitis caused by poor hygiene. Defectors report severe abuse of conscripts by other troops, including rape, extensive black marketeering, and alcohol and drug abuse. Some defectors fight alongside the *murabidin*. The Soviets have made greater efforts to exchange captured *murabidin* for Soviets held by the resistance.

Soviet Political Moves

Soviet diplomacy in 1987 has concentrated on a single theme: Moscow's alleged desire to find a political solution to the conflict. The Soviets have announced repeatedly that the "political decision" to leave Afghanistan has been made. At the same time, they have not backed down from their insistence that the PDPA play a leading role in any postwithdrawal regime. In essence, the Soviets have been pushing hard at the negotiating table for the victory that is becoming increasingly elusive on the battlefield.


There have been several different expressions of Soviet policy on Afghanistan over the past year, suggesting that Gorbachev's search for a solution in Afghanistan is a continuing process and that the Soviets are ready to consider less optimal solutions than in the past. However, there still is no sign that Gorbachev has made the hard decision to leave Afghanistan and let his PDPA clients depend on the will of the Afghan people for their political survival.

The past year has seen Soviet movement on a number of questions related to Afghanistan. On the issue of a withdrawal timetable for Soviet forces, for instance, the Soviet position has moderated considerably. Whereas in 1986, the Soviet regime insisted on a 4-year timeframe, in February 1987, they reduced it to 18 months and in September to 16 months. In December, leading up to and during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington, Soviet spokesmen spoke repeatedly of a 12-months (or less) timeframe. They also referred to Najib's conditional offer of 12 months (or less). No formal offer has been tabled at Geneva, however. Also, there is no agreement on the important questions of when the timetable would begin or how the withdrawals would be scheduled.

The Soviet position that an end to "outside interference" must precede any withdrawal of Soviet troops would appear to be satisfied in the draft Geneva text on "mutual noninterference." The key question here is one of definition. As long as Moscow maintains that fighting in Afghanistan is *prima facie* evidence of "outside interference," they are saying, in effect, that their troops will not leave until the war is won on Soviet terms.

Over the past year, Soviet officials have discussed Afghanistan in many forums, although thus far they have been unwilling to deal directly with *mujahideen* representatives. U.S. and Soviet officials have been holding regular exchanges on Afghanistan since 1986, and in late 1986 and early 1987, Soviet and Pakistani officials met for discussions as well.

In early November 1987, in a departure from past practice, a retired Soviet military officer appeared at a public forum in The Hague with a representative of a resistance party. This may foreshadow a Soviet willingness to deal directly with *mujahideen* leaders in the future. Soviet officials also have become more willing to consider alternative political arrangements for Afghanistan than before. In line with Kabul's "national reconciliation" policy, Soviet officials now call for a coalition government in Kabul, although they still insist that their clients—the PDPA—must control the presidency and major ministerial portfolios, thereby ensuring a dominant PDPA role in any such arrangement. During the past year, Soviet officials have shown an interest in some role for the former king, Zahir Shah.



Growing Unhappiness on the Home Front

Concern about the fighting in Afghanistan and its impact on life appears to be increasing, but there is little evidence of widespread opposition to the war. Complaints, however, have become more frequent, and Moscow is responding with vastly expanded and more realistic press coverage of the war and special counterpropaganda campaigns throughout the country.

This effort now appears to have backfired. These campaigns have had the unintended consequence of making Soviet citizens even more worried and ever more willing to question Moscow's policy. A letter published in *Pravda* on November 25, 1987, is typical; it stated that "There is talk that the war in Afghanistan would have ended long ago if along with the sons of [ordinary people] the children of the leaders were sent there as well."

Cynicism and anger are especially widespread among combat veterans and those who might be sent to Afghanistan. While many officers may have benefited from Afghan service, enlisted personnel have not. Many have returned home openly hostile to the war, bringing with them psychological, drug, and a wide variety of other problems. Efforts to help veterans or to draw them into pa-

triotic propaganda work have generally failed. In the November 1987 *Opposition*, for example, one veteran urged "our radicals to 'lead a dirty war a dirty war,'" and another said "The main question about Afghanistan is not the truth about the horrors and the deaths, but why are we there?" Partially as a result, draft evasion has increased to the point where military journals discuss it openly.

The Kabul Regime

Military and Security Forces

After massive infusions of equipment, training, money, and advice, the regime's armed forces cannot defend the government without major Soviet assistance. Combat experience over the last 9 years has not improved performance, which appears to have reached a new low.

Under Najib the armed forces have made no significant improvements. The army continues to retain about some 40,000 men, less than half its preinvasion level. The air force has approximately 10,000. The numbers of

paramilitary, militia, Secret Police (KHAD), and border guards fluctuate with a total strength probably less than 100,000. Kabul can take little comfort in the questionable abilities and loyalties of its personnel.

In combat operations, Kabul's forces depend on Soviet air and artillery support and Soviet advisers. Regime troops have been unable to fight their own or any significant scale this past year. Indeed, the regime continues to lose numerous outposts as the *awakh* nibble away at Kabul's crumbling authority. Afghan air force pilots occasionally have refused to fly.

Conscription and Desertion.

Recruitment remains a serious problem, especially with regime control ebbing in many areas. Those party cadres still in the countryside also are charged with helping the conscription effort. A regular conscription cannot raise enough troops; the regime is forced to rely on forced conscription, press-ganging. Young men throughout Afghanistan are taken to receive schooling, family connections in the party, government jobs, or flee the country to avoid the sweeps of army units to find good new recruits.

Draftees are thrown into battle with little or no training and with predictable high casualties and desertions. Most officers are poorly trained, with party loyalty being more important than professionalism. High casualty rates further reduce military power, since medical care is rudimentary.

The most serious problem facing Kabul's forces is desertion. Troops desert by the hundreds. Several times Afghan units deserted as a whole. Other units were only prevented from deserting by force. Defectors from Kabul comprise an increasing part of the military since it is only in the capital that the army can capture enough youths.

Factionalism remains a chronic problem within Afghan units. Differences appear to have been accentuated in the aftermath of Karmal's removal, easing the way for increased *awakh* penetration. Karmal loyalists have largely been purged from key military and security positions.

Militia. Najib has placed more emphasis on the militias and directed more resources to them. Nevertheless, militia elements have even worse training and equipment than the regular army and have not significantly added to regime strength.

Police. The Ministry of the Interior, headed by Khalq faction chief Gulabzoi, includes some 40,000 police. Ministry of Interior paramilitary forces, the *Sarmadars*, are equipped as a light infantry force. In 1987, *Sarmadars* were increasingly posted outside Kabul in order to reduce their threat to the Najib regime and reinforce depleted military. On its limited combat operations, the *Sarmadars* suffered severe casualties. The Interior Ministry also has control over regional militias, revolutionary defense groups and civil defense youth militias.

Tribal militias are independent, often remaining on the regime payroll only for the winter months. Under the nominal control of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, these elements are normally used near the border with Pakistan in an attempt to limit infiltration. Some of the tribal militias facilitate regime military operations in their areas, which they know better than regular troops.

The Secret Police (KHAD). The Secret Police continues to be known by the Afghan acronym KHAD, from the days when Najib was its chief. When he was promoted to head the regime, he boosted the former State Information Service to cabinet status as the Ministry for State Security (Dari acronym WAD). KHAD maintains a reputation for brutality and ruthlessness, including the use of torture.

KHAD now is led by Najib protégé Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, who was promoted both to Politburo status and to the military rank of Colonel General, the highest held by regime military. Numerous Soviet KGB advisers are reportedly very influential. KHAD has some 20,000 personnel. These numbers are maintained, in large part, because KHAD personnel are extremely well paid.

KHAD is responsible for regime security, counterintelligence, and the suppression of opposition—both in the resistance and among Afghans who continue to live under regime control. It has military forces under its command, which have played a small, but growing, part in the war. KHAD operatives are

present at Afghan military installations to try to prevent desertions or defections to the resistance. KHAD also is responsible for foreign intelligence and, in large measure, for the terrorist campaign in Pakistan.

National Reconciliation

The new year began with an announcement from Najib that the PDPA was willing to share power with its opponents. His January 1 call for "national reconciliation" had three main elements.

First, the regime (and Soviets) and the opposition would observe a cease-fire.

Second, opposition representatives would be invited to participate in the regime, creating a "national unity government."

Third, about 5 million refugees would be asked to return.

Ultimately, the purpose of the "national reconciliation" campaign was to convince the Afghan people to "reconcile" themselves to continued PDPA domination.

Phantom Cease-fire. Key to Najib's plan was a cease-fire, which he said the government would observe for 6 months from January 15, 1986. Najib said the opposition must not fight, plant mines, transport, and store weapons and must refrain from subversive action. Afghan troops would return to bases but could conduct security tasks, without restrictions on supply and transport.

Afghan and, to a lesser extent, Soviet troops for a short time did observe a cease-fire, but there were always some troops in action. Within 2 weeks, major operations were again underway, in contrast to Najib's claims that the regime observed the cease-fire for about 50 days. The *awakh* responded with a greater level of activity over the winter, which increased throughout 1987. Najib extended the cease-fire for an additional 6 months in June and again at the *Loqi Jirga* in November. The regime and Soviets did not reduce operations after either of these extensions.

The offer to share power was a departure from previous regime initiatives which had sought to "broaden the base," or include nonparty or neutral

figures under the regime. The appeal was traceable to Gorbachev's July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, which called for an opposition role in the regime. Najib made his New Year announcement shortly after returning from his first trip to the Soviet Union as Kabul's leader.

To induce refugees to return, Kabul made a number of material concessions. It promised to restore property confiscated from those who had fled, return seized financial assets, provide relief from accrued interest and tax obligations, defer military service (and a halt to forced press gang conscription), and provide material assistance for resettlement. However, refugee return was less than Kabul's exaggerated claims (100,000 by year's end) and was exceeded by continued refugee exodus (see p. 19).

Few Afghans with political stature before the Marxist takeover have joined the regime. Those who have joined have not brought major constituencies with them. Appeals to expatriate Afghans in the West have similarly failed.

Despite regime claims about defectors (30,000 in August 1987), *mujahidin* commanders have almost universally spurned Kabul's reconciliation efforts. Regime announcements of local cease-fire areas can be read as an admission of widespread *mujahidin* control.

Reconciliation Offer Enriched.

The failure of "reconciliation" to gain support led Kabul progressively to broaden its offer. After the rejection by the *mujahidin* of the January cease-fire call, Kabul's concessions increased.

In February, Najib offered to meet opposition representatives in a neutral setting—recognizing their status as equals. Kabul's offer to negotiate remains, but the resistance insists on talking to the Soviets rather than the "puppet regime." By mid-winter 1987, Najib had offered to accept an undefined role for former king Zahir Shah.

On July 14, Najib extended the so-called cease-fire for an additional 6 months beyond its July 15 expiration date. He offered specific posts to the opposition, including more than a dozen cabinet seats and the posts of vice president and of deputy prime minister. He also suggested that the post of prime minister could be negotiable. (This was later specifically offered.) Najib's offer



Kabul regime leader Najibullah laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow, July 21, 1987. (Agence France Presse TASS)

did not include any of the ministries principally responsible for security, or the Foreign Ministry, or even the Ministry of Finance.

Najib invited royalists and members of the "moderate" parties to assume these high-level, but powerless posts. Kabul targeted these groups for its appeals, apparently hoping to split the resistance. Najib promised "genuine division of power" but asserted that it "does not mean the PDPA would lose its authority."

On July 15, the regime finally issued a draft constitution (see p. 15). It was designed to replace its *Fundamental Principles*, promulgated in 1980 but never ratified. The regime launched a national public relations campaign to garner support for the new constitution. Ultimately, Kabul claimed that 2 million Afghans approved the document and that it received 15,000 suggestions for changes. Many details, but little substance, were changed in the final draft, submitted to the November *Loya Jirga*, or assembly.

A Multiparty Facade. By mid-year, Najib also began to speak of a multiparty system. Parties (organized under regime auspices) would be required to support the state and "nation-

al reconciliation" but would be allowed some independence. The constitution appears to associate the parties with the PDPA-dominated National Front. Regime spokesmen noted that the new parties would have to respect Afghanistan's historic "friendship with the Soviet Union."

In November, the establishment of four new parties was announced. Two were leftist groupings that had earlier been "merged" with the PDPA. Just as Najib forecast in early summer, there also were two regime-dominated parties identified with the "peasantry" and "patriotic clergy." Najib later said that he would welcome a party for the "national bourgeoisie."

The resistance (particularly the moderate leaders referred to by Najib) swiftly rejected the July 14 coalition offer, as it had his earlier proposals. Soon after, Najib was called to Moscow to meet Gorbachev. A communique announced that they discussed "further measures" along the path of reconciliation. Najib, at a subsequent press conference, said that he would give up not only his position but his life, if he personally became an obstacle to peace.

In the fall, the "national reconciliation" offer broadened still further. At the October party conference, Najib forecast the "Second Stage of National

Reconciliation," including leftist democratic unity, coalition, and the strengthening of posts offered to the opposition. Najib specifically named the "seven [Alliance] parties" in his appeals. The opposition would be allowed to open offices and publish newspapers if they renounced their resistance.

Following his admission that Soviet troops had pulled back from some hinterland posts, Najib said Soviet troops would leave, and regime forces not operate in areas where the *mujahidin* ceased their attacks. He implied the resistance could run those areas. At the November *Jogi*, he said that Soviet troops could be withdrawn in 12 months or less if the resistance would give up their fight against his regime.

"De-conciliation." Najib's "peace" campaign, combined with the modification of Soviet Kabul positions on the timing of a withdrawal, have fed concern among Karmal regime supporters. There are numerous reports of regime members attempting to accumulate foreign exchange in preparation for an escape. Others established or upgraded contacts with the resistance.

The national reconciliation program exacerbated endemic PDPA factional disputes. Ideologically committed Marxists, particularly among the Khalq faction, opposed the offer to share power with the opposition and the tactical retreat on "progressive" policies. Although Najib acknowledged criticism from within the party of the reconciliation process, he repeatedly stressed that national reconciliation is "irreversible."

Hopes for Peace. Understandably, the "national reconciliation" campaign kindled sentiments in favor of return among the refugees and of hopes on both sides that the fighting might be ended inside Afghanistan. Ultimately, the refugees, by their refusal to return, and the *mujahidin*, by their continued resistance, maintain that there can be no peace while the Soviet occupation continues and the PDPA remains in power.

Changes in Government

In 1987, the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul received a new name, a new constitution, a new head of state, and dozens of new faces. Most of these changes were associated with the

"national reconciliation" effort. Despite a year of change, however, the regime remained under the thumb of the Soviets and their instruments of rule, the PDPA and Najibullah.

Najib continued to replace Karmal backers in the government as well as in the party. The Revolutionary Council, at a September 30 session, named Najib its chairman and head of state. He replaced nonparty H. M. Chamkani, acting chairman since Babrak Karmal's ouster a year before. Chamkani remained vice chairman, but the second in command was apparently shifted to PDPA politburo member Nur Ahmed Nur, who as deputy chairman ran the council in Najib's absence.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) transformed itself into the Republic of Afghanistan (RA) at a *Loqa Jogi*, held November 29 and 30. The vast majority of the more than 1,500 delegates were ruling party members or regime functionaries. The session was the second so-called *Loqa Jogi* held by the Kabul regime and was no more legitimate than the council convoked by Babrak Karmal in 1985. Like that session, Najib's meeting was quickly condemned by the Afghan resistance and ignored by most Afghans.

The *Jogi* also adopted the new constitution proposed in July, completely transforming the formal structure of government, which had retained a revolutionary structure since the 1978 Marxist coup. In one of their last acts, the delegates elected Najib as president of the Republic of Afghanistan. But at his inaugural press conference, the new president was embarrassed when he was forced to admit that his own, albeit estranged, brother had defected to the resistance.

A Party in Disarray. Change also shook the party, as Najib continued efforts to consolidate his position within the PDPA. Several party plenums were held to elicit, or coerce support among reluctant cadre for "national reconciliation."

However, since Najib took over, factions have proliferated in the party, within and beyond the two major groupings: Babrak's and Najib's Parcham, and the Khalq—now led by Gulabzoi.

Former leader Babrak Karmal continues to withhold his endorsement from Najib. Despite increasing purges from party, military, and government positions, Babrak's faction, nurtured by 6½ years of Soviet patronage, has not

yet given up. A large demonstration by supporters of the deposed leader, at coup anniversary festivities in April, reportedly prompted the Soviets to "invite" Babrak to Moscow with his family a few days later. Babrak remained in the U.S.S.R. of the end of the year.

Action against Karmal's supporters continued throughout the year as the former president's brother Baryalai and close associate Anahita Ratebzad were removed from first the Politburo, then from the central committee. Ten additional Karmal backers were dropped from the central committee at the 17th plenum in October. Najib's protégé Ghulam Faraq Yaqubi, head of the Secret Police, and Foreign Minister Wakil earlier had been given full Politburo membership.

Party reorganization culminated in the second PDPA party conference, held in mid-October. Its goal was to improve party unity and discipline and promote "reconciliation." Efforts to hold the conference had bogged down in part because several local party sessions, including a Kabul precinct, tried to elect Karmal as a delegate. At the conference, Najib painted a stark picture of party disarray: "A number of leadership and party personnel have brought doubt, panic, and pessimism." The result, according to Najib, was a party wracked with "factionalism, nepotism, and sometimes even revenge."

The Afghan Economy

As the war in Afghanistan intensifies, so has the destruction and erosion of the economic base. While estimates differ, the latest figure cited in regime and Soviet media for wartime destruction is 50 billion Afghanis. Included in the estimate of damages, which the regime attributes exclusively to the *mujahidin*, are about 2,000 schools, several hundred mosques, and more than 100 medical establishments.

At the PDPA conference in November, Prime Minister Keshtmand, who is responsible for the economy, noted severe problems on the industrial side. In the last year, production of natural gas (Afghanistan's major export)

An Illegitimate Constitution

On November 30, the *Loya Jirga* approved a new constitution. Najib introduced the draft as "the most important document of the national reconciliation policy." The document was swiftly rejected by the resistance and, like the so-called *Loya Jirga* that adopted it, is viewed by most Afghans as illegitimate.

Although it changed the name of the regime, dropping "Democratic" from the current name, "Republic of Afghanistan," Najib's constitution would perpetuate the power of Kabul's Soviet-backed Marxist rulers. It contains significant elements commonly found in Soviet-bloc constitutions and provides for leading roles for the PDPA and its associated organization, the National Front.

The most striking aspect of the constitution is its near total concentration of power in a strong presidency, unchecked by other branches of government. The president:

- Acts as supreme commander of the armed forces;
- Approves all laws, decrees, and resolutions;
- Convenes and dissolves the National Assembly and *Loya Jirga*;
- Appoints the prime minister, Supreme Court, and attorney general;
- Approves appointments of cabinet, high-ranking officials, and military officers;
- Declares a state of national emergency;

- Vetoes decisions of the National Assembly; and
- Declares war "with agreement of the *Loya Jirga*."

Bicameral Legislature. A lower house would have 10 representatives popularly elected from each of Afghanistan's 29 provinces. One-third of the upper house, or "Senate," would be appointed by the president. The assembly can override presidential vetoes by a two-thirds vote.

Loya Jirga. A *Loya Jirga* (or Grand National Assembly) is accorded its traditional role as Afghanistan's ultimate source of authority. However, contrary to the consensus tradition of the institution, decisions are by majority rule. Also breaking with tradition, it does not include tribal and traditional leadership. Instead, delegates are from the regime, the PDPA-directed National Front, the assembly, or are chosen by the president.

The Courts. The judiciary not only lacks independence but is clearly subordinate to the executive. The Supreme Court reports on the activities of all courts to the president, who appoints members for limited terms of 5 years.

Foreign Policy. The constitution provides that Afghanistan is non-aligned and "does not join military blocs nor allow establishment of foreign military bases." This provision would appear to be contravened currently by the presence of Soviet troops and bases.

Rights and Liberties. The constitution makes specific guarantees of a full spectrum of individual rights and guarantees equal rights to women. However, every right is paired with accompanying provisions that deprive it of its meaning; ultimately, "no one has the right to act against the public interest," which the state itself would define.

Religion. Article 2 establishes Islam as "the religion of Afghanistan." No law may be contrary to Islamic tenets "and the values enshrined in this constitution." Islamic law (Shari'a) is used as a guide to inheritance court judgment. However, "no citizen has the right to use religion for antinational or antipeople propaganda purposes, or contrary to the interests of the RA."

Political Parties are allowed, provided that they are "not opposed to the values embodied in the laws of this Constitution and in the laws of the country." Nevertheless, the PDPA is given a leading role as the formulator of national reconciliation. Marxist rule is further preserved by the importance given the National Front, a PDPA subsidiary. The National Front, described as "the most extensive sociopolitical organization," would unite parties and their members "on the basis of a common program." Among other powers, the front would be the only nongovernmental body authorized to propose laws to the National Assembly.

and other basic goods slumped. Deficiencies in domestic production had to be made up by the Soviets.

Price levels depended on market conditions for a particular item or place. Inflation was noticeable but not dramatic for a wartime situation. Early in the year, anticipation of a settlement among the refugees and preparations for return drove the price of the Afghani (Afs) up in Pakistan. Toward the end of the year, erosion of the Afghani in part was due to efforts of regime members to accumulate foreign currency in case they fled the country.

The Afghani remains officially pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of 55 Afs \$1. The rate on Kabul's unofficial but free money market fluctuated around 150-155 Afs \$ for most of the year. It rose to about 180 Afs \$ late in the year.

Agriculture and Food Supply

The wheat crop, Afghanistan's predominant food source, was generally the same and perhaps a little larger than in previous years. Yields in the subsistence, peasant agriculture that dominates in Afghanistan remain stable. There was no major crop failure anywhere in the country. However, the cities, especially Kabul, continue to be fed by imports. Regular commercial channel imports from Pakistan rose. Wheat continues to be imported from the Soviet Union.

Food shortages continue to occur, in large part due to distribution problems or shortfalls in imports. Spot shortages often result from transport difficulties—the road system is severely

degraded except for the segment between Kabul and the U.S.S.R. Shortages become most serious in late April-May before the harvest. Areas north of Kabul and Qandahar, Konduz, Paktia, and Paktika Provinces experienced the most problems. Land abandonment was aggravated by actual destruction of crops and agricultural infrastructure by Soviet regime military operations.

Massive Soviet use of artillery and high-level saturation bombing caused total crop damage to increase, but overall damage remained a relatively small fraction of total area and production—probably 5%-10% of cultivated area has been damaged since the invasion. Fruit growing areas were particularly targeted by the Soviets.

There was significant damage to some agricultural areas in and around Qandahar, including grape arbors, that had previously been immune from

damage. Sustained heavy fighting caused land abandonment near Qandahar, adversely affecting production. Kanduz experienced serious damage, both in the spring and in August. Perhaps the worst hit area of the year was north of Kanduz near the Soviet border, which was almost devastated. This was the site of reprisal raids for *insubordination* activity in the Soviet Union. Shortages in Kabul were exacerbated by the city's growing population and because of destruction caused by heavy fighting in the nearby Shomali Valley, where Soviet forces destroyed grape arbor and other agricultural assets.

Despite destruction of both agriculture and industry, many Afghans continue their lives of subsistence farming, herding, and trading and are no worse off than before the coup and invasion. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world (see p. 16). According to the most recent International Monetary Fund estimate, gross national product is about \$200 a year (1986). According to some regime estimates, however, per capita income may be as low as \$130-150 per year.

The Private Sector

Kabul continued to moderate disruptive economic reforms while continuing to promote, where possible, state enterprise. Efforts to stimulate the private sector continued. In February, Sayyid Amanoddin Amin, a businessman, was named vice chairman of the Council of

Ministers (one of several deputy prime ministers). In April, the regime held a conference for private investors but failed to attract international or expatriate Afghan investors. An unusual development was the establishment of joint ventures between the Soviet Government and Afghan private businesses.

Trade

Keshitmand told the party conference that Afghanistan's foreign trade totaled \$1.4 billion in 1986-87. Of the total trade, 16% was with less developed countries and 68% with socialist countries of which 60% was with the U.S.S.R. Natural gas remained Afghanistan's major export, some 50% of total value. In the Afghan year ending March 1986, about 2.4 billion cubic meters were shipped north to the U.S.S.R., at the world market price, according to Kabul's Minister of Mines and Industries.

Soviet Aid in 1987

During the year, the U.S.S.R. continued its heavy budgetary support to the Afghan economy. In addition to about \$220 million in development assistance, the Soviet Union pledged a record \$105 million in grant commodities in 1987. Regime and Soviet media reported that this grant aid was intended to support the national reconciliation process.

U.S.S.R.: Economic Aid to Afghanistan

Year	\$ Million
1980	350
1981	200
1982	220
1983	350
1984	220
1985	225
1986	205

Some of these aid commodities were, in fact, distributed in Afghanistan's towns and villages by Soviet troops or by Afghan military or party officials. On several occasions, Kabul and Soviet media directly chastised Afghan party and state officials for embezzling or misusing Soviet aid.

Moscow also made new allocations to projects already begun under some \$750 million of outstanding credit agreements. Preliminary information indicates that Soviet aid disbursements rose substantially over the \$205 million in 1986, possibly to the record 1980 level.

The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ushered in a more expensive era for the Soviet aid program in noncommunist developing countries. The grant package provided Kabul in 1987 brought total commodity support since 1980 to \$1.4 billion. Until its first

Statistics on Afghanistan, 1975-85

Year	Military Expenditures (ME)	Armed Forces	Gross National Product (GNP)	Central Government Expenditures (CGE)	People	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME Per Capita	Armed Forces Per 1,000 People	GNP Per Capita
1975	104	130	3,788	410.9	14.1	2.7	25.3	7	9.2	268
1976	91	142	4,015	550.9	14.5	2.3	16.5	6	9.8	277
1977	92	143	4,164	479.4	14.9	2.2	19.2	6	9.6	280
1978	100	110	4,335	496.6	15.3	2.3	20.1	7	7.2	284
1979	260*	89	4,297	570.1*	15.6	6.1	45.7	17	5.7	276
1980	254*	43	4,164	788.7*	15.0	6.1	32.2	17	2.9	278
1981	219*	45	4,279	807.1*	14.1	5.1	27.1	16	3.2	304
1982	183*	55	4,093*	577.1*	13.6	4.5	31.7	13	4.0	300
1983	225*	75	3,955*	359.3*	13.7	5.7	62.7	16	5.5	289
1984	287*	60	3,735*	444.7*	13.8	7.7	64.4	21	4.3	270
1985	NA	55	3,438*	NA	13.9	NA	NA	NA	4.0	248

* Data for 1979-1985 are based on the 1986-87 fiscal year.

NA = Not Available

Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, "Annual Report on the Economic and Financial Situation of the Republic of Afghanistan, 1986-87," Kabul, 1987.

large-scale commitment of commodities to Kabul in 1980, the U.S.S.R. had steadfastly refused to provide more than token amounts of free commodities to any developing countries not associated with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In Afghanistan, Moscow was forced to provide consumer goods and food to support Kabul when it was cut off from other sources of imports and, more recently, to provide local funds for Soviet-sponsored projects.

The U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan signed a comparatively large number of agreements and protocols during the year. A protocol of cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet-bloc CMEA was signed in November.

A new economic and technical agreement in January 1987 also provides for increased assistance during Afghanistan's current 5-year plan (1986-91) to agriculture, water management, and power development, although it does not appear to provide new development credits. It mentioned aid for the centerpiece of Moscow's current program, a 10-year, \$150-million project to connect Kabul and several adjacent provinces with the Soviet power grid by 1991. In addition, major irrigation projects at Jalalabad and Nangarhar, completed in the 1960s and 1970s, would be renovated and expanded to irrigate 600,000 hectares of crop and grazing land. Moscow is scheduled to complete 130 projects during the 5-year develop-

ment plan; its total aid accounting for up to three-fourths of all annual economic aid flows to Afghanistan through 1991.

In a departure from the traditional Soviet Afghan aid relationship, separate agreements were signed directly between Afghanistan's 29 provinces and republics in the U.S.S.R. These were particularly concentrated between the northern part of Afghanistan and the adjacent republics of Soviet Central Asia, but nearly all provinces were involved. For example, the Russian Republic made a direct transfer of agricultural machinery and fertilizer to Kabul City.

Social Developments

Youth and Education

Kabul's educational system remains dependent on the Soviets. In June, Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. signed an education protocol "to ensure the teaching of various subjects," under which Soviet education advisers would be maintained in Afghanistan.

The Soviets continue to take Afghans of all ages to the U.S.S.R. for long-term education and training, in hopes of creating a loyal cadre. There are nursery schools specifically designed for Afghan children in the Soviet Union. About 1,700 Afghan

children spent the summer at Pioneer (Komsomol) camps in the U.S.S.R. More than 10,000 Afghan youths are in the U.S.S.R. on long-term civilian and military training. Each year more than 1,850 are sent. At least 1,500 higher and professional students were sent to the U.S.S.R. for advanced training. There is no indication, however, that the regime's long-term efforts are producing a loyal communist political base among Afghans.

There continue to be credible reports that the regime is using child spies. In January, it was reported that children too young for the military were picked up in press gang sweeps and then dispatched to the Kabul Police Academy for agent training.

Najib has claimed that some 40% of the teachers are members of the PDPA and that 30% of students either belong to the PDPA or to the Democratic Youth of Afghanistan (DYOA). DYOA Chief Farid Mazdak, a Najib protege, was elevated to the Politburo of the PDPA. Members or not, students must participate in forced labor; over the summer, several groups were dragged in Kabul to assist reconstruction in Qandahar.

Health

The health situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. Facilities under regime control remain inadequate and overtaxed. During heavy fighting, when blood supplies ran low, Kabul's clinics forced patients to give blood. (Soviet media have reported intensive blood drives in Soviet Central Asia.)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concluded an agreement with the regime in January to resume humanitarian work. ICRC workers had been expelled just after the Soviet invasion and allowed to return only 2 months in 1982. The agreement is keyed to the resumption of Red Cross work among regime prisoners, which ICRC remained unable to fully implement.

Volunteer foreign doctors continue to provide some medical care in areas under resistance control, but they are subject to attack inside the country. Medical care is increasingly being offered by Afghan "barefoot doctors," trained by some of the same organizations that have sent expatriate doctors into the country. Commander Jallaluddin Haqqani of Paktia told an interviewer that, for the *mujahidin*, health conditions had recently improved 50%-100%.

Afghanistan: Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1977-86*

Year	Arms Imports (\$ millions)	Arms Exports (\$ millions)	Total Imports (\$ millions)	Total Exports (\$ millions)	Arms Imports Total Imports (%)	Arms Exports Total Exports (%)
1977	175	0	523	488	33.5	0
1978	192	0	585	475	32.9	0
1979	683	0	581	648	117.6	0
1980	624	0	688	836	90.6	0
1981	835	0	717	800	116.6	0
1982	507	0	749	763	67.6	0
1983	331	0	956	753	34.6	0
1984	650	0	1,390	633	46.8	0
1985	508	0	1,155	539	44.0	0
1986	565	0	NA	494	NA	0

*Dollar amounts expressed in constant 1984 dollars.
NA = not available.

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987* to be published.

Status of Women

The regime continued to pay lip service to its commitment to improve the status of women and referred to women's rights in its constitution. In practice, however, the status of women within the regime has never been as high as Kabul claimed; indeed, it has declined over the past year.

Najib admitted to the party conference that women make up only 3.6% of the party apparatus and about 9% of trade union officials. Even in ministries such as education, where women are 43% of the workforce, the regime has promoted no women into leading positions.

The highest ranking woman in the regime, Anahita Ratebzad, was purged from the party leadership, because of her support for the deposed Babrak Karmal. There are now no women on the Politburo.


Religion

Despite claims it has become more Islamic, the regime has failed to convince Afghans that it is still not dominated by the atheistic, Marxist PDPA. Najib cited the Koran and a newly formed Council of Religious Leaders and Ulama as the original sources of the policy of national reconciliation.

Regime efforts to assume an Islamic mantle are perhaps best illustrated by Najib's reassumption of the Islamic "ullah" (name of God) as a suffix to his own name, upon being named president by the Revolutionary Council in September. Though he had not used his full name since he joined the party in the 1960s, Najib said he felt it was appropriate to reclaim it as leader of a pious nation.

One of Kabul's means of using religion to promote its control is by attempting to co-opt the clergy in areas under regime control. It claimed 2 billion Afghans were spent on mosques and to "help the prayer leaders," without mentioning that these sums come from the religious institutions' own endowments. Najib, speaking at the shrine of Ali in Mazar-e-Sharif, claimed 16,000 mullahs, preachers, and clergy receive salaries from the state. Monetary inducements are backed up by coercion against those clergymen who do not cooperate.

Kabul also attempted to use its new-found piety to promote its image in the Islamic world. The regime held an international contest for Koranic recital and opened an Institute of Islamic Scientific Research but has been unable to



Afghan girls at a school maintained by the resistance. (Mohammed Es-Haq, Jamiat-i-Islami)

obtain support from religious institutions in the Muslim world. Cairo's Al-Azhar University closed a mission in Kabul.

Illegal Drugs

Afghanistan remains a major producer of hashish and opium. Estimated hashish production in 1986 was 200-400 metric tons, one of the highest in the world. Afghanistan appears to be the leading producer of illicit opium in the Golden Crescent and the second largest producer in the world. The 1986 poppy harvest yielded an estimated 500-800 metric tons, a substantial increase from 1985. Good weather in producing areas suggests a similar figure for 1987. Some of the opium is refined into heroin, principally in Nangarhar Province on the Pakistan border.

Much of Afghanistan's hashish and opium and nearly all of its heroin are exported to or through Pakistan and Iran. Illicit drugs also have been smuggled into the Soviet Union—complicating the domestic Soviet drug problem—and through that country to Western markets.

Increased Soviet efforts against traffickers have produced evidence that the Soviet Union is used as a drug transit route. As a result of a joint Soviet-Canadian operation, approximately 5 tons of hashish were seized in Canada in August 1987. The hashish was unloaded from a Soviet ship docked in Montreal. On another occasion, authorities in Moscow announced they had seized \$30-million worth of hashish bound for West Germany.

Current information on drug abuse inside Afghanistan is difficult to obtain, but it is estimated that there are over 100,000 chronic opium abusers. Regime officials have hinted that Kabul has its own drug problems.

All major resistance organizations in principle oppose narcotics production, trafficking, and abuse, and most individual *mawlawis* adhere to this policy. Invoking Islamic disapproval, some resistance groups are waging an active antidrug use campaign, but illicit crop destruction is limited.

Human Rights

Abuse of human rights remains a key corollary of the unpopular Kabul regime's efforts to maintain power. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common; a fair trial is not. Some prisoners are held for years without access to legal assistance, family, or medical care. Prisons are overcrowded. Food, water, and sanitary facilities are in short supply, and many prisoners are chronically ill.

Torture and mistreatment of prisoners continue to be widespread and systematic in the Kabul regime's prisons. During incommunicado detention, physical and psychological torture is used to extract "confessions" and to intimidate regime opponents. Prisoners are beaten; subjected to electric shocks; burned with cigarettes; immersed in cold water or snow; forced to watch other people being tortured; placed in

cells with the corpses of other torture victims; and deprived of water, food, and sleep. Human rights groups continue to receive credible reports concerning executions of political prisoners.

Prisoners and Amnesty. A major component of "national reconciliation" was amnesty for prisoners, but the regime has not lived up to its promises. According to regime spokesmen, some 6,000 prisoners were released through November. Local observers reported only 320 prisoners were released in March, versus 1,300 claimed by the regime.

Among the released prisoners were members of the PDPA's Khalq faction, some in jail since the Soviet invasion, and members of leftist nationalist organizations. Old people, women, and children also were released. Few resistance prisoners and no significant *mujahidin* have been released. For the regime, the most important category was those imprisoned for military offenses. They and other able-bodied detainees were conscripted immediately upon release.

Conscription. One of the first announcements made by the regime during the recent "national reconciliation" campaign was the end of forced conscription. Despite this promise, the regime has resumed the practice. In its current drive to swell the ranks of the military, the regime has extended its "recruitment" to include 15- and 16-year-old youths along with recently returned refugees. Reports indicate that the regime gains recruits by surrounding high schools as graduation ceremonies take place. Parents have demonstrated at Kabul conscription centers in search of their lost sons. Some were themselves taken away, and the demonstrations ended by gunfire.

Human Suffering. The most serious violations of human rights in Afghanistan are the pervasive violence and dislocation inflicted on the population by Soviet and Afghan forces. These include apparent Soviet violations of the humanitarian rules of war. Killings of civilians have continued unabated as Soviet Kabul forces retaliate and attempt to create secure zones. Some sources report that from the end of last year until August of this year, about 15,000 civilians have been killed.

Indiscriminate air and artillery attacks, time bombs set to detonate during peak travel hours along popular supply routes, and boobytraps cleverly

designed to be attractive to children are but a few of the tactics used against noncombatants by the Soviets and their regime allies. Resistance forces also occasionally commit violence against noncombatants, mostly political figures associated with the regime, but sometimes in the course of operations.

The Kabul regime also denies the following human rights to the Afghan people: freedom of speech and press; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; the right to privacy; and the right of citizens to change their government.

The nearly 40 years of Marxist rule and Soviet occupation have wreaked unprecedented tragedy on the Afghan people, according to the "Preliminary Findings From A Survey of Afghan Refugees," conducted by Gallup Pakistan. The survey, based on interviews with 1,300 refugee families, found that over the past 10 years, 9%—or 1 in 11 members—of the Afghan families surveyed have been killed in the past decade. This is greater than the fatality rate in the Soviet Union during World War II.

Forty-six percent of those killed (mostly women) died in aerial bombing of civilian houses or while fleeing; 33% died as a result of wounds from bullets; 12% from artillery shelling; 3% from mines; 2% from exhaustion; and 4% from miscellaneous causes. About 5.5% of the refugee population died of natural causes such as aging or harshness of life as refugees. But the Afghans live on—about 24% of the present refugee population were born in exile in the camps.

UN Human Rights Commission. Each year since 1984, the UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur, Felix Ermacora, revealed overwhelming evidence of widespread massive human rights violations in Afghanistan. This year, the Kabul regime, which earlier tried to impugn the Special Rapporteur and his report, allowed Ermacora to visit Afghanistan for the first time. The regime thus acknowledged, also for the first time, the role of the Special Rapporteur. Ermacora paid a brief visit to Kabul and later to Peshawar, where Afghan refugees protested Kabul's attempt to cover up the ongoing use of torture in regime prisons.

Although Ermacora observed in his report that there has been some ame-

lioration of human rights conditions in certain government-controlled areas in Afghanistan, he reiterated his previous statement that "there can be no meaningful self-determination for the Afghan people so long as the Soviet presence continues."

The Third Committee (Human Rights) of the UN General Assembly voted for a third consecutive year to adopt a resolution on human rights in Afghanistan. The vote was 85 for, 21 opposed, and 28 abstentions—an improvement over the 1986 vote of 79-23-36.

In the spring, at its 43d session, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted two resolutions on Afghanistan. One, on the human rights situation, extended the mandate of Special Rapporteur Ermacora. A resolution calling for self-determination in Afghanistan was adopted by a vote of 30-5-6.

Refugees

Afghans in Pakistan are the single largest group of refugees in the world. The Government of Pakistan reports registration of more than 2.9 million Afghans. Numbers continue to grow, although at a much slower pace than in the early years after the coup and invasion. In 1986, refugee officials in Pakistan registered only about 70,000 new refugees. Preliminary estimates from 1987 are lower still. Many areas of heavy fighting are already heavily depopulated.

Afghan refugees are sheltered in more than 320 camps, primarily in the rural areas of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Relief assistance—including food, shelter, clothing, and medicine—is provided by the international community, primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program.

Although the number of new arrivals is lower in 1987 than in previous years, there is no indication that many refugees are returning to Afghanistan in response to the Kabul regime's national reconciliation campaign. UNHCR officials in Pakistan see no basis for Kabul's claim that 100,000 refugees have returned to Afghanistan in 1987. Neither UN nor Pakistani officials discerned a measurable drop in camp

populations. It is unlikely that many would return under any PDPA-led, Soviet-sponsored regime. Kabul also claims 37,000 refugees returned in the previous 7 years. There were several reports in the summer and fall that some refugees have returned to newly secure resistance-controlled areas inside Afghanistan.

Despite considerable economic and political costs, the Government and people of Pakistan have extended an impressive welcome to the Afghans. The Pakistani Government estimates that the annual relief effort costs some \$360 million and that its share of this effort comes to nearly half that amount, chiefly expenditures for program administration and transportation of relief commodities. Pakistan is further strained by refugee competition for local jobs, grazing, and water supplies.

Refugee relations with Pakistan have been surprisingly good, largely due to the strong cultural and social ties between the indigenous population and the newcomers. Soviet regime agents continue their efforts to raise Pakistani concern over the refugee presence.

Between 1983 and 1986, the World Bank, in conjunction with the UNHCR, committed \$20 million for forestation, irrigation, and road-building projects that employ refugee and local labor in repairing environmental damage caused by the refugees. These projects were so successful that Phase II, a \$40-million, 3-year project was begun in 1987.

The U.S. Government, the largest contributor to the relief effort, pledged nearly \$68 million for Afghan assistance in fiscal year 1987 including \$38-million worth of commodities through the World Food Program. To date, total U.S. contributions for Afghan refugee assistance exceed \$551 million. Other major contributors are Japan, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and a number of West European nations.

The second largest concentration of Afghan refugees is in Iran. The Iranian Government estimates that up to 1.9 million Afghans are within its borders. Many Afghans in Iran have successfully integrated into the local population. The Iranian Government provides some assistance. The United States is not a contributor to the UNHCR effort in Iran.

Regional Environment

Pakistan

After the Afghans themselves, Pakistan bears the primary burden of the war in Afghanistan. In 1987, the war continued to spill directly into Pakistan. Kabul's air raids on Pakistani and refugee villages intensified early in the year, climaxing during the opening days of the February-March session of the Geneva talks. Hundreds were killed and wounded. The cross-border raids stopped when Pakistan threatened to leave the talks, but the raids recommenced after the talks recessed. Within a month, however, as Pakistan actively pursued improved air defense, Soviet-Kabul tactics suddenly changed. Bombs that had been carried by planes were now delivered by Kabul-sponsored terrorists. At the same time, Kabul con-

tinued to destabilize the Pakistani frontier areas by providing arms to exacerbate local, tribal, or communal disputes. More people were killed and injured in 1987 by Soviet Afghan attacks in Pakistan than ever before (see p. 21).

The Soviet Afghan terror and subversion campaign in Pakistan was already more than 1 year old. Bomb explosions have become an almost familiar sound in Peshawar restaurants, hotels, cinemas, and other public places. Kabul-directed saboteurs also detonated bombs at bridges and public places elsewhere in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, where the bulk of refugees are concentrated.

In 1987, Kabul agents for the first time exploded several bombs in the Pakistani heartland. The capital, Islamabad, and its sister city, Rawalpindi, Lahore in Punjab, and even distant Karachi on the Arabian Sea, suffered civilian casualties from the terror campaign. The bombings are particularly frightening because Kabul's agents target public facilities like shopping centers and schools. A single bomb blast in Karachi in July killed more than 70 people.

More than 1,000 saboteurs have been arrested in Pakistan in connection with the terror campaign. Some have been tried and sentenced, some of them to death. Most are Pakistani citizens. Many have confessed that they were paid, trained, and given targets by Afghan intelligence officials.

The public's fear of the bombs increased suspicion among Pakistanis toward the Afghan refugees, despite the fact that the public is generally aware that the bombs are Afghan Soviet in origin. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to be steadfast on the Afghan issue. Some politicians have advocated accommodation with Kabul, but the government and principal opposition figures continue to back the national consensus in support of the Afghan people.

In 1987, Islamabad intensified its efforts bilaterally with the Soviets and through the United Nations and other channels to find a political, negotiated solution to the Afghan conflict.



Soviet manufactured bomb dropped by Kabul regime aircraft in Pakistan. (Craig Karp.)

Casualties Due to Border Violations by Soviet/Regime Forces and Terrorist Blasts in Pakistan, 1980–October 1987

Year	Air Attacks			Artillery Attacks			Terrorist Explosions			TOTAL	
	Violations	Persons Injured	Persons Killed	Violations	Persons Injured	Persons Killed	Incidents	Persons Injured	Persons Killed	Persons Injured	Persons Killed
1980	174	4	2	25	—	—	—	—	—	4	2
1981	94	3	5	17	—	—	—	—	—	3	5
1982	59	—	—	22	4	—	2	4	—	8	—
1983	93	2	—	41	8	—	47	27	4	37	4
1984	119	261	133	49	24	38	28	48	8	333	179
1985	256	38	19	121	19	25	118	173	96	230	140
1986	779	67	39	495	120	56	487	798	216	985	311
Oct 1987	574	437	183	517	130	50	450	953	198	1 520	431

Iran

Tehran has maintained its basic policy calling for the speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops. Iran refuses to participate in the Geneva talks on the grounds that the *mujahidin* are not represented. In 1987, however, Iranian policies on Afghanistan fluctuated.

Iran's rejection of the Soviet occupation is an "Islamic" issue that has wide domestic support. Tehran's day-to-day Afghan policies, however, have always been subsidiary to the greater considerations of the Persian Gulf war, its overall Middle East Islamic strategy, and the general state of relations with the U.S.S.R., with which Iran shares a long border.

Until 1987, Iran's Afghan policy was coordinated within Iran by Ayatollah Montazeri. In the beginning of the year, Iran apparently increased support for the resistance. Iran improved ties with the Sunni (Peshawar) resistance parties, as well as its traditional clients, Shia groups based in central Afghanistan. (Iran hosts the "Alliance of 8," mostly Shia Afghan resistance parties.) In January, for the first time, the Iranian Foreign Ministry invited Afghan Jamiat-i-Islami head Rabbani for an official visit to Tehran. His previous visits to Iran had been under quasiofficial clerical auspices.

Iran also launched its own "regional" peace initiative in February, when it proposed roundtable talks involving the Soviets, Pakistan, Iran, and the *mujahidin*. The Kabul regime was

excluded from the offer. The proposed participants did not take up Tehran's offer.

Iranian-Afghan tensions continued as Kabul protested instances of violence against its diplomatic personnel by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In August, both Iran and Afghanistan protested the violation of each other's territory at the main border crossing between Mashhad and Herat. Tehran charged its border post was hit by artillery shelling from the Afghan side. The Iranian pro-Soviet Marxist opposition groups, Tudeh and Fedayeen-e-Khalq, continue to be active in Kabul.

By late summer, the Iranians showed some accommodation toward Kabul in the wake of their improving relations with the Soviet Union. In the fall, Iran's ambassador in Kabul attended an official state function for the first time since the invasion. Support for the *mujahidin* and relations with the Sunni resistance parties also diminished. Nonetheless, Tehran continued to publicly condemn the Soviet occupation.

China

China continues to cite the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a threat to regional security and a major obstacle to the improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union. China raised Afghanistan in its renewed bilateral discussions with the U.S.S.R.

During a June visit to Islamabad, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang "confirmed China's support for Pakistan's principled position" on the Afghan issue. During the June visit, it was an-

nounced that the Chinese Government had donated a large quantity of goods for the refugees, including 1,250 tons of rice and a million yards of cloth.

International Concern

The plight of the Afghan people continues to attract the world's attention. Demands for an end to the occupation can be heard year round. In December 1986, newspapers of varying ideological stripe (including communists) from numerous countries sharply criticized the Soviets for the occupation. Support was limited to a few editorials in papers published by pro-Moscow communist parties.

India

India maintained its interest in a political solution to the Afghan problem and continued to call for an end to foreign intervention and interference in Afghanistan. India maintained good relations with the Kabul government and continued its modest pre-1979 program of foreign assistance. In 1987, India's contacts with Kabul became more visible. An early summer Indian trade fair in Kabul was one of the largest non-Soviet foreign-sponsored spectacles since the invasion.

India welcomed Kabul's "national reconciliation" effort. An unprecedented exchange of high-level official visits began with the visit of Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil to New Delhi in February. In July, Indian Foreign Minister Tiwari became the highest level non-Soviet-bloc official to visit Kabul. Several regime delegations were subsequently received in New Delhi. Politburo member and Communications Minister Watanjar signed an agreement on communications assistance. Other technical assistance agreements were also initiated by New Delhi. In November, Indian efforts to obtain a "consensus" UN General Assembly Afghanistan resolution came to naught. Subsequently, India again abstained on the UNGA resolution.

Islamic Countries

In January, the leaders of the resistance alliance attended the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Kuwait and then-spokesman Abd al-Sayyaf addressed the delegates. The summit once again issued a resolution supporting the Afghan refugees, the *mujahidin*, and Pakistan calling for a withdrawal of Soviet forces, and suggesting that an end to the Soviet occupation would remove a major barrier to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic countries. Kabul was rebuffed in its year-long effort to reclaim Afghanistan's seat in the conference. It also failed in its effort to gain entry to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

At the third general Islamic conference in Mecca in October, Abd al Rahman Abd al Khaliq from Kuwait called upon Islamic states to sever relations with the Soviet Union for its continued occupation of Afghanistan.

European Support

Afghanistan remains a primary source of European criticism of the Soviet Union, both official and from groups otherwise sympathetic to Soviet policies. Kabul was moved to protest when French Foreign Minister Raimond met with resistance alliance leaders during a May visit to Pakistan.

In December, the European Community (EC) issued a statement calling

for an immediate end to the occupation of Afghanistan, including a Soviet withdrawal completed before the end of 1988. This followed a statement earlier in the year in which the EC provided the basis for a European diplomatic effort on Afghanistan, focused on the United Nations.

Soviet Efforts To Curb Press Coverage

International public interest in the Afghan war remains high. It has never been easy, however, to get the news out of Afghanistan. Kabul permitted more foreign journalists to visit, but mostly for regime events. Although they are not allowed to move about freely, journalists often witness evidence of regime frailty, such as the *waraboden* shelling and the internecine shootout that plagued the so-called *Loya Jirga*.

In contrast to the dramatic increase in the quantity and realism of Soviet media coverage, there has been an effort on the part of the regime and the Soviets to intimidate foreign reporters traveling with the resistance. Because of improved resistance air defense, however, there may have been more foreign correspondents inside Afghanistan in the summer of 1987 than previously.

In October, antipress efforts intensified. The regime protested the visit of a group of Pakistani journalists to Paktia Province. Near Kabul, a BBC TV crew, which was invited by the regime, was threatened and detained by Soviet troops, who also detained diplomats who tried to intervene. A French journalist, Alain Guillo, was captured in November. He was still imprisoned at the end of the year, charged with trying to obtain military secrets. An Italian journalist was reported captured in December.

The campaign to target foreign journalists had more tragic results. Two American filmmakers, Lee Shapiro and Jim Lindelof, were apparently killed by a regime attack while traveling with the *mujahidin*. In 1986, Lindelof had been named paramedic of the year for his efforts training Afghan medical workers. In response to protests,

Kabul stated it could not "guarantee the security of foreign subjects" who enter illegally, whose presence it views as "evidence" of "external interference."

Kabul's Diplomatic Offensive

Kabul made only limited gains in its Soviet-supported worldwide effort to gain international legitimacy. The regime sent representatives to 52 countries in hopes of upgrading relations. Many countries turned away Kabul's representatives.

One of Kabul's major diplomatic triumphs was the June visit of Prime Minister Keshtmand to Iraq. Keshtmand was seen by Saddam Hussein, the highest level at which a regime functionary has ever been received outside the Soviet bloc. They signed an agreement on trade and technical cooperation, ratified in September.

During 1987, the regime managed to establish diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe and Cyprus and reached agreements on opening embassies in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, and Austria, the regime's first embassy in Western Europe. Kabul Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil was received at the Austrian Foreign Ministry when he journeyed to Vienna in September to open the embassy. Several African countries, under pressure from Moscow, agreed to exchange nonresident ambassadors.

Kabul's limited successes cost the Soviets some diplomatic capital, if not also tangible resources. However, the net effect inside Afghanistan or on the Afghanistan-tarnished Soviet world image was limited. More importantly, even those countries that in some way responded to Kabul's diplomatic entreaties did not budge on the UN General Assembly resolution, the major objective of Kabul's diplomatic efforts.

UN Negotiations

Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly has voted nine times, by overwhelming and generally increasing margins, for a resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the restoration of Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status, Afghan self-determination, and the creation of conditions that

would enable the refugees to return home with safety and honor.

At the 42d UN General Assembly, introduced as in the past by Pakistan and cosponsored by 47 countries, the resolution passed on November 10 with a record vote of 123 (U.S.) to 19, with 11 abstentions, a one-vote increase over the 1986 affirmative vote total of 122. The vote was considered a decided defeat for the Soviet Union, in the wake of its year-long effort to erode support for the resolution.

In addition, the Soviets, the Kabul regime, India, Syria, and Democratic Yemen made last-ditch attempts to amend Pakistan's Afghanistan resolution with so-called consensus language on the eve of the November 10th vote. The Soviets and others, realizing that they lacked the necessary votes, withdrew their amendments just prior to the final vote.

UN attempts to negotiate a settlement date from a November 1980 mandate of the General Assembly. Negotiations are led by UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez, the Secretary General's personal representative. Talks have been held periodically since 1982 in Geneva. Cordovez shuttles between delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan, officially informing Iran of the discussions while unofficially informing the Soviets.

The UN Secretary General has reported that the four instruments that would comprise the agreement are "virtually complete." The text is largely settled on three of four proposed instruments, the first dealing with mutual noninterference in Afghanistan's affairs, the second encompassing international guarantees, and the third governing the voluntary return of the refugees.

The fourth agreement, which is to address the key issue of a Soviet troop withdrawal and the interrelationship between that document and the other three, is unfinished. The principal outstanding issue remains an agreement on a realistic timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Two sessions of the seventh round of the indirect talks were held in Geneva in 1987. The first, convened February 25, lasted until March 9. At the end of August, Kabul suddenly requested an early resumption of the talks and a second session was held September 7-10.

The first session was held during heavy cross-border attacks on Pakistan. For a week Afghan planes bombed and rocketed Pakistani villages, killing and wounding hundreds. On March 2, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan threatened to leave the talks if the attacks did not cease. The raids stopped, and after some preliminary negotiation, newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil tabled a proposal that would reduce the period required for Soviet troop withdrawal to 18 months, less than half the 4-year position it maintained in 1986. Pakistan offered to accept 7 months, up from 4 months.

Kabul's insistence that a September round be convened at short notice fed widespread speculation that Kabul would table a 12-month timetable. Instead, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil reduced the offer only 2 months, to 16 months. Pakistan countered with 8 months, but there was no Afghan counteroffer. Both Cordovez and Yaqub expressed disappointment with Kabul's intransigence, particularly since the session had been proposed by Kabul.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Wakil said that "the policy of national reconciliation and the Geneva talks, as two separate processes, are contributing toward the achievement of a single objective." His implication of linkage between Kabul's futile efforts to gain domestic support and a Soviet withdrawal was rejected at the UN General Assembly by Pakistan Prime Minister Junejo, who charged that the Afghan call to Geneva was "false propaganda" aimed at the UN vote.

In his annual report on Afghanistan, the UN Secretary General reported that negotiations had reached "an advanced stage" and that "substantial, but not sufficiently sustained progress" had been made. He urged all Afghans "inside and outside their homeland" to look beyond a settlement and identify "processes and policies that they might deem appropriate to ensure continued peaceful conditions in Afghanistan and the region." All sides are committed to continuing the talks, which are expected to resume early in 1988.

U.S. Policy

The United States seeks a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan which brings about the complete and prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops and self-determination for the Afghan people as outlined in the UN General Assembly resolutions passed by overwhelming majorities each year over the past 8 years. The United States supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General's personal representative to achieve a settlement. The single remaining issue to be agreed to is Soviet troop withdrawal. So long as the Soviet Union continues to occupy Afghanistan, the U.S. Government will maintain its strong support for the Afghan people's cause. The United States has noted recent Soviet professions of intent to withdraw from Afghanistan. The U.S. Government urges the Soviet Union to match its words with deeds at the earliest possible time.

This was the primary thrust of President Reagan's message to Gorbachev at the December 1987 summit in Washington. The President urged the Soviets to agree to a short timeframe and declare a "date certain" for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Humanitarian Assistance

The U.S. Government contributes heavily to a sizable humanitarian assistance program designed to minimize the suffering of those who have chosen to remain in the villages of the war-ravaged Afghan countryside. Congress provided \$15 million for the program in FY 1986 and \$30 million in FY 1987. The projected funding for FY 1988 is \$45 million. In addition, the United States is donating wheat and vegetable oil to support the cross-border program. In FY 1988, a minimum of 40,000 metric tons of wheat, valued at \$7.6 million, will be provided.

The humanitarian assistance program is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Through the program, hundreds of tons of food, medical supplies, cold weather clothing, and other humanitarian goods have been provided to war-affected Afghans to counter the ongoing, sys-

tematic destruction of their crops and property. The program also seeks to develop the capabilities of the Afghan resistance Alliance to provide education, health, and agricultural services to the people inside Afghanistan. To plan and implement its activities, the Alliance has set up technical committees.

Although still in the nascent stages of development, each of the committees can claim significant achievements. The Education Committee is implementing a program through which almost 660 schools inside Afghanistan are being supplied with textbooks, instructional aids, and administrative materials. It also has initiated a literacy program for adults which has thus far attracted an estimated 8,000 participants.

The Health Committee has developed a training program which is graduating 240 basic health workers every 3 months. It is establishing and supply-

ing hospitals and clinics inside Afghanistan and planning a major immunization campaign that will begin in early 1988. With less than a year of operational experience, the Agriculture Committee is already sponsoring the preparation and radio broadcast of agricultural extension programs and the rehabilitation of a number of irrigation canals.

To complement the activities of the Alliance committees, the U.S. Government supports private voluntary agencies from the United States, France, West Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, and Sweden. In FY 1987, \$9 million was provided to 12 voluntary organizations for 15 activities. More than half of these funds were granted to support health activities. The remaining funds finance food, agriculture, and education activities.

A separate program created by Congress in FY 1986 to help improve the living conditions inside Afghanistan is the Humanitarian Relief Program. Through this program, the Defense Department and the Agency for International Development provide nonlethal, excess Defense Department property as well as transport humanitarian goods donated by private sector organizations to the Alliance. Under the same program, war wounded Afghan patients are transported to the United States, Europe, and Middle East for free medical treatment. To date, an estimated 450 patients have been placed, 270 of them in U.S. medical institutions. ■

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